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Abstract 
Using the 2004 United Kingdom Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS 2004), this paper examines the impact of corporate governance on 
HRM practices and employment relations outcomes within organizations in the 
UK.  The analysis suggests that when a remote external stake-holder is assigned 
dominance, particularly in the case where their liability is limited and the 
organization is large, the conditioning of managerial commitments on the 
requirements of the dominant stake-holder has the potential to undermine the 
effectiveness of the HRM system in achieving its objectives.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A central debate in corporate governance revolves around the question of how 
best to deliver optimal economic performance and distributional justice within 
organizations.  This debate has highlighted the possibility that the prioritization 
of shareholder interests in public companies may undermine their ability to 
perform effectively over the long-term (Wilkinson 2003).  Yet studies otherwise 
critical of the role of shareholders have shown that it may be possible to 
overcome this ‘governance constraint’ by such means as: effectively 
‘managing’ the company’s relationship with its shareholders to encourage them 
to take a longer-term perspective on their relationship with the organization; 
institutional investor activism to promote the long-term performance of the 
organization and hence the value of its shares; and the use of block-holding 
ownership and insider control to encourage a more stable system of stake-
holder relationships within the firm (Armour, Deakin and Konzelmann 2003; 
Deakin, Hobbs, Konzelmann and Wilkinson 2002). 
 
To understand the relationship between corporate governance and long-term 
organizational performance, it is necessary to examine more closely the role 
that stake-holder relationships might play; and within this, given the centrality 
of those between employees and managers, the contribution of human resource 
management (HRM) and employment relations.  There is a substantial HRM 
literature that finds a positive link between employment relations and 
organizational performance;
i
 but how performance is enhanced by HRM is not 
well understood (Delery 1995; Truss 1991).  Part of the problem is that 
organizational performance depends upon a wide range of factors that are not 
directly influenced by – but might themselves have an influence on – HRM.  
Thus, a consideration of how HRM might influence organizational performance 
requires an acknowledgment that there are essentially two inter-linked 
determinants of performance: (1) the ability of the organization to effectively 
operate within its external environment; and (2) the ability of the HRM system 
to deliver the outcomes it is designed to achieve in support of the firm’s 
objectives.  The focus of this study is on the latter. 
 
In recent years, with growing interest in the relationship between corporate 
governance and employment relations, a body of literature has emerged that 
finds patterns of relationship that vary across national productive systems 
(Gospel and Pendleton 2005; Jacoby 2005).  For example, the market-oriented 
Anglo-American system is one in which the governance of public companies is 
directed towards dispersed-shareholder ownership and outsider control. In this 
context, the HRM function has traditionally been exposed to market pressures 
and has needed to react to stock market requirements; and this has been 
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reflected in relationships between managers and employees. By contrast, the 
governance of continental European and Japanese corporations is characterized 
by dominant block-holder share ownership and insider control, which provides 
greater security for internal stake-holders (managers and employees) and a 
closer identification with the organization and its objectives. In this context, 
HRM plays a more pro-active role.  Nevertheless, despite common features, 
there is also evidence of diversity across organizations within national systems 
(Gospel and Pendleton, 2005).   
 
Other strands of research into corporate governance and employment relations 
within organizations in the United Kingdom (UK) have identified patterns 
associated with alternative forms of corporate governance and the ways in 
which they prioritize stake-holder interests (Konzelmann, Conway, Trenberth 
and Wilkinson 2006).  Building on this research, we investigate the 
interrelationship between corporate governance form and employment relations 
within organizations in the UK.  The empirical analysis is based on the 2004 
UK Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS 2004), which permits 
examination of establishments operating under alternative forms of corporate 
governance including: public sector organizations; listed public limited 
companies (PLCs); unlisted PLCs and private limited companies; partnerships 
and self-proprietorships; and organizations serving their membership or the 
public interest.
ii
  Section two explores the interrelationship between corporate 
governance, stake-holder relations and organizational performance. Section 
three examines these relationships and their effects in the UK, using WERS 
2004.   Section four concludes. 
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, STAKE-HOLDER RELATIONS AND 
HRM  WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Corporate governance regulates the ownership and control of organizations 
(Berle and Means 1932).  It sets the legal terms and conditions for stake-holder 
relationships, and in so doing influences their incentives and, potentially, their 
willingness to work together.  Cooperation is important because it makes 
effective the necessary diffusion of responsibility for production, process 
improvement and innovation. It also serves to secure the commitment of stake-
holders to the objectives of the organization, and to making fully available their 
skills, knowledge and experience.  
 
However, it does not follow from the centrality of co-operation for production 
and managerial efficiency that all of the interests of managers and workers are 
shared. While they clearly have common interests in the present and future 
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prosperity of their organization because this forms the basis of their income and 
employment security, interests diverge with respect to distribution of the 
organization’s income because what one receives the others cannot have. 
Further, as the flow of income available for distribution is a joint product of the 
activity of all those involved in production, there is no objective method by 
which the contribution of any individual can be identified and suitably rewarded. 
In such circumstances, it cannot be assumed that workers will readily accept 
that the terms and conditions of their employment should be determined by 
management as part of the HRM package, premised on shared responsibility for 
production. Nevertheless, both sides can be expected to have a shared interest in 
securing an agreement, which by recognizing the legitimacy of the other side’s 
interests helps to secure their joint future. The ability to achieve these objectives, 
and in so doing to release the full potential of collective enterprise, can 
therefore be considered a productive factor.  
 
Ideally, securing effective cooperation is a central purpose of HRM in its role in 
enhancing organizational performance (Guest 1997 and 2001; Konzelmann 
2003). But the ability to resolve the distributional conflict inherent in the 
employment relationship will depend not only upon the income the organization 
has available; it will also depend upon the weight that managers are required to 
give to the different income claimants as determined by the form of its 
corporate governance. By conditioning managerial commitments on the 
requirements of a dominant stake-holder group, corporate governance may have 
an impact on the effectiveness of HRM practices and, as a consequence, on the 
organization’s ability to achieve effective cooperation.  This is particularly the 
case when it compromises the commitments that managers need to make to 
those stake-holders such as employees upon which it most depends for 
performance delivery (Wilkinson 2003; Konzelmann et. al. 2006).  
 
In considering the effects of corporate governance on stake-holder relations, 
HRM policy and outcomes and organizational performance, it is useful to 
distinguish between internal and external stake-holders, as determined by their 
involvement in the organization’s productive activities. Managers and workers 
directly employed by the organization and fully engaged in its productive 
activities, for example, are completely internal, whereas agency and other forms 
of temporary workers, suppliers, customers, communities, shareholders and the 
government are to varying degrees more external. The significance of the 
distinction between internal and external stake-holders lies in the level and 
continuity of commitment each needs to make to ensure the success of the 
organization, and, in turn, the importance to the stake-holder’s well-being of 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary reciprocation of that commitment by the 
organization. For example, there is a high level of mutual dependency between 
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the organization and its directly employed managers and workers; and the 
success of the organization depends very much upon the commitment of these 
internal stake-holders while they, in turn, rely on the organization for their 
present and future income, job satisfaction and employment prospects. By 
contrast, at the other extreme, shareholders in listed PLCs (as stake-holders) 
have no direct role to play in the productive activities of the organization. 
Moreover, their well being is unlikely to be exclusively or even mainly 
dependent on any single organization. Therefore, the degree of mutual 
dependency and commitment between the organization as a producer and its 
shareholders can be expected to be low.   
 
However, the degree of commitment the organization is required to make to 
each of its stake-holder groups is not only determined by mutual dependence in 
production. In a highly competitive product market (or in one with highly 
concentrated buyer power), for example, a supplier might be required to 
prioritize the interests of customers to the neglect of those stake-holders it 
depends upon in production. More directly related to the purpose of this paper, 
the form of corporate governance may require managers to rank the 
distributional priorities of the organization’s stake-holders in ways that could 
compromise their commitment to the workforce, and in so doing, undermine the 
interests of the organization as producer.   
 
It follows from this that the further the dominant stake-holder is from direct and 
continuous involvement in the organization’s production of goods and/or 
services, the more difficult it may become for internal stake-holders to 
implement and maintain strategies capable of securing long term operational 
effectiveness. In organizations with a dominant external stake-holder, such as 
shareholders or the state, the requirement that management prioritizes such 
interests may reduce their ability to give the necessary weight to the interests of 
internal stake-holders; and this will make it more difficult to secure their 
commitment to organizational objectives. The demands of the dominant stake-
holder could therefore impact on HRM practices developed and implemented 
by internal stake-holders, and on the achievement of their objectives.  In the 
public sector, for example, the objectives of the government, acting as the agent 
of the users of public services and the taxpayers are twofold: (a) to meet 
demand for high quality services and (b) levels of taxes that taxpayers find 
acceptable. The ability to accomplish the first of these objectives requires the 
full commitment of internal stake-holders (i.e. public sector workers), but this 
may be impeded by the fiscal stringency resulting from governmental tax policy 
designed to meet the second objective. In listed PLCs, the placing of 
shareholder interests first may condition management to give priority to 
dividend pay-outs and short-term share value appreciation, achieved by 
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concentrating on cost cutting and labor force downsizing to the neglect of the 
longer-term interests of the business. By contrast, in organizations for which 
corporate governance designates an internal stake-holder as dominant, such as 
partnerships and self-proprietorships, the resolving of distributional disputes 
will depend mainly on the managers and employees who have most to gain 
from working together to secure long-term organizational viability.   
 
But corporate governance not only structures and conditions stake-holder 
relationships, it can also be expected to affect and be affected by the size of the 
organization and the establishments it operates.  This, in turn, will have 
consequences for the formality of HRM systems, which together with 
organizational objectives and stake-holder relationships will influence both the 
HRM practices adopted and the resulting system of employment relations.  
Figure 1 provides a useful illustration. 
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Figure 1 
Corporate Governance, Size and HRM 
 
Corporate 
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Size 
Stake-holder 
Relations 
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The HRM System 
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Saving 
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As discussed above, the form taken by corporate governance can be expected to 
have an influence on stake-holder relations and consequently on employment 
relations not only directly; it can also be expected work together with the 
objectives of organizations in shaping the HRM practices adopted, and 
especially the balance between cost-saving and involvement-enhancing 
practices.  For example, the greater the emphasis on price as opposed to quality 
and service-based competition, the greater the likelihood of a bias towards more 
cost-saving HRM practices and antagonistic employment relations, which 
themselves become embedded in the products or services produced. When there 
is also a strong emphasis on quality and service, involvement-enhancing HRM 
approaches may be needed to temper the adverse consequences of more 
exploitative HRM practices.  The balance in HRM practices can also be 
expected to influence employment relations, with the more exploitative 
practices undermining such outcomes as job satisfaction, organizational 
commitment and the quality of employee/management relationships. 
 
Corporate governance is also likely to impact HRM and employment relations 
through its influence on size.  Certain forms of corporate governance, such as 
listed PLCs, facilitate large size by making possible by the acquisition large 
amounts of equity finance with the attendant dispersion of risk while the 
attraction of large firms to stock market investors reinforces and encourages this 
form of governance.  At the other end of the spectrum are organisations like 
partnerships and self-proprietorships, in which the high level of risk borne by 
partners and self-proprietors puts a constraint on their size.  Firm size can be 
expected to have an impact on the degree of formalisation of the HRM system. 
In general, larger firms use formal HRM practices more extensively as a way of 
organising work to recapture some of the benefits of worker involvement lost 
by Taylorist forms of work organization that evolved with increasingly large 
sized organizations (Konzelmann et. al. 2006).   By contrast, in smaller firms, 
there are fewer impediments to the ability to deliver the outcomes expected 
from the effective use of HRM – i.e., high levels of employee autonomy, self-
supervision and responsibility for production – without necessitating the 
adoption of formal HRM systems and practices. 
 
Corporate governance is therefore likely to have both a direct impact on 
employment relations and an indirect effect through its influence on the nature 
of the bundles of HRM practices adopted.   
 
Corporate Governance and Stake-holder Dominance in WERS 2004 
The WERS 2004 survey grouped corporate governance forms into twelve 
categories:  self-proprietorships and partnerships (including limited liability 
partnership); private limited companies; public limited companies; companies 
 8 
 
 
limited by guarantee; trusts/charity; body established by Royal Charter; co-
operatives, mutuals and friendly societies; government limited companies, 
nationalised industries and trading public corporations; public service agency; 
other non-trading public corporations; quasi-Autonomous national government 
organizations (QUANGOs); and local/central government (including NHS & 
local education authority) 
 
Self proprietorships are owned and operated by a single individual, who is fully 
liable for the debts of the business but who also has the right to all of the profits 
generated. In partnerships, one or more people own the business and share the 
profits; and each partner is personally liable for any debts that the business 
might incur. A limited liability partnership is similar to an ordinary partnership, 
except that that the liability of each partner is limited to the amount of money 
the partner has invested in the company.  In each of these types of organization, 
sole proprietors or partners are the dominant stake-holders. They are insiders in 
that they are directly involved in managing and are likely to be reliant on the 
business for a substantial part of their income. Moreover, as they usually have 
unlimited liability for the debts of their business, their business and personal 
finances are closely interdependent. This is less so for limited liability 
partnerships, although it is to be expected that partners in these firms have a 
substantial financial commitment to the business and carry significant risk. 
 
Unlike self-proprietorships and partnerships, limited liability companies exist in 
their own right, distinct from the shareholders who own them; and corporate 
finances are clearly separated from the personal finances of their owners. 
Shareholders have an entitlement to the company’s residual income (i.e. that 
remaining when all other income claims have been satisfied) but they have no 
liability for the debts of the company, although they may lose the money 
invested.  Limited liability companies can be either private or public. Private 
limited companies can have one or more shareholders but they cannot offer 
shares for sale to the public. Public limited companies (PLCs) must have at least 
two shareholders; they can offer shares for sale to the public, although they may 
or may not be listed on the stock market.  In limited liability companies 
shareholders are the dominant stake-holders, and managers are legally required 
to manage on their behalf. However, the limits to shareholder liability means 
that they are less financially ‘tied in’ to their companies than sole-proprietors or 
partners, although this will importantly depend on the extent of the dispersion 
of share ownership. The degree of shareholder ‘tie in’ will also depend on 
whether the companies whose shares they hold are listed on the stock exchange, 
a well-organised market for shares which provides a ready shareholder exit 
from companies.   
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Companies limited by guarantee (CLGs) have neither shareholders nor shares. 
They have members, called guarantors, who undertake to contribute should the 
company need it. CLGs cannot distribute profits and these are generally 
reinvested. Common examples of CLGs include clubs, membership 
organizations and charities.  The membership or beneficiaries are the dominant 
stake-holders, and the managers are required to act on their behalf. 
 
A trust is an organization in which ownership of property to hold and manage 
for the benefit of a third party is vested in trustees, who cannot benefit from the 
trust. A registered charity is required to devote its resources to charitable 
activities as specified in its rules approved by the Charity Commission.  For 
both trusts and charities, beneficiaries are the dominant stake-holders, and the 
trustees or managers are required to act on their behalf.   
 
Royal charters are granted by the monarch to give special status to incorporated 
bodies. The four hundred or so royal charter organizations in the UK include 
cities; the British Broadcasting Company (BBC); theatres including the Royal 
Opera House, Theatre Royal and Drury Lane; Britain’s older universities; 
professional associations; and charities. Most royal charters are now granted to 
professional institutions and to charities. In these bodies, the consumers, 
members, citizens, or beneficiaries are the dominant stake-holders, and the 
management boards are required to act on their behalf. 
 
Co-operatives (co-ops) are associations of persons who join together to carry on 
an economic activity of mutual benefit. They can include housing cooperatives, 
worker cooperatives and consumer cooperatives. In housing cooperatives, for 
example, residents own shares in the legal entity which owns a group of homes. 
Each member typically has a lease agreement with the co-op, and the co-op’s 
rules typically provide tenure for its residents; expulsion generally requires a 
substantial majority vote of the members.  A Mutual is a commercial 
organization owned by its members. Examples include building societies and 
some life insurance companies. Friendly societies (sometimes called a mutual 
societies, benevolent societies or fraternal organizations) are mutual 
associations, composed of people who join together for a common financial or 
social purpose.  Cooperatives, mutuals and friendly societies are all forms of 
common ownership in which the members are the dominant stake-holders.  Of 
these, worker co-operatives are the only example of corporate governance 
where workers have a degree of stake-holder dominance. However, people who 
work for co-operatives are not necessarily members of the co-operatives 
(including possibly the managers).  As a group, the co-operators in worker co-
operatives are the dominant stake-holders with rights to the residual income. 
The individual employment contact of members is with the co-operative, 
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although cooperative membership may condition employment relationships. As 
owners, individual worker co-operators are financially ‘tied into’ their place of 
work in much the same way as members of partnerships.  
 
The public sector organizations identified by WERS include government 
limited companies, nationalized industries, trading public corporations, public 
service agencies, non-trading public corporations, QUANGOs, and local and 
central government organizations (including the NHS & local education 
authority). In operational terms, the government, as regulator and paymaster, is 
dominant in public sector organizations, its authority being backed-up by 
statutory powers. However, this dominance is conditional on electoral support, 
which provides incentives for political parties to commit themselves to low 
taxation and high levels of public service. As a result, taxpayers and users of 
public services can be regarded as the ultimate dominant stake-holders in public 
sector organizations. However, the interests of tax payers and users of public 
sector services may conflict: the former demanding to pay as little as possible 
and the latter wanting high levels of good quality services
iii
.  Faced with these 
contradictory claims, government tends to use its dominance to bridge the 
resulting resource gap by intensifying work relative to pay in the public sector. 
In effect, the fiscal deficit is offset by a real resource levy on public sector 
workers extracted by public sector managers. This role as auxiliary tax collector 
helps explain why financial managers and other non-clinical administrators in 
the NHS are so unpopular with the frontline staff (Wilkinson, et al. 2006). 
 
Using the corporate government forms identified in WERS 2004, we created 
composite categories based on commonalities of dominant stake-holders, 
liability for debts or dependence on returns derived from long-term 
organizational performance, and their level of commitment to the organization.  
These composite corporate governance forms include public sector 
organizations; listed PLCs; unlisted PLCs and private limited companies; 
companies serving the interests of owner-members or the public (i.e., CLGs, 
trusts, charities, bodies established by royal charter, cooperatives, mutuals and 
friendly societies); and partnerships and sole proprietorships.   
 
Corporate Governance, Size and HRM 
Table 1 outlines characteristics of the types of corporate governance form 
identified in our study and the influence they are likely to have on 
organizational objectives and the dominant view of human resources within the 
firm.
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TABLE 1:  Corporate governance and Human Resources in the Anglo-American System 
 
Type of 
Organization 
And Median 
Est. Size 
 
Dominant 
Stake-holder 
Liability of 
Dominant 
Stake-holder 
for Debts of 
the business 
Commitment 
of Dominant 
Stake-holder 
to the 
Organization 
Agent Acting 
on Behalf of 
Dominant 
Stake-holder 
Vulnerability of 
Agent to 
Requirements of 
Dominant 
Stake-holder 
 
Primary 
Organizational 
Objective 
 
Dominant View of 
Human Resources 
Public sector 
organizations 
(138 employees) 
 
Customers / 
Taxpayers 
(external) 
 
No direct 
liability 
 
High (due to 
reliance on 
service) 
 
 
Government 
 
Continuous and 
high (market for 
votes) 
High quality / low 
price products for 
customers 
produced at low 
cost for customers / 
taxpayers 
Central to 
accomplishment of 
potentially competing 
quality, price and cost 
objectives 
Listed PLCs 
(167 employees) 
 
Shareholders 
(external) 
 
Limited 
liability  
 
Low (due to 
liquidity of 
stock market) 
 
Management 
Continuous and 
high (Market for 
corporate control) 
 
Short-term  
shareholder value  
 
Cost to be minimized 
Resource to be 
exploited 
Unlisted PLCs & 
Private limited 
companies 
(48 employees) 
 
Shareholders 
(external) 
 
Limited 
liability 
 
 
High (because 
cannot sell 
shares) 
 
 
Management 
 
Low  
(but managers 
can be sacked) 
 
Long-term  
shareholder value 
Productive resource 
contributing to long-
term performance 
objectives 
Organizations 
serving the 
interests of 
owner-members 
or the public 
(76 employees) 
Owner-
members, 
beneficiaries or 
the public 
(internal) 
 
Limited 
liability 
 
High (due to 
reliance on 
service) 
 
 
Management 
 
Low  
(but managers 
can be sacked 
Long-term 
economic 
performance and 
institutional 
viability 
(profitability and 
sustainability) 
Central to 
accomplishment of 
long-term 
performance 
objectives and 
institutional viability 
 
Partnerships & 
self-
proprietorships 
(20 employees) 
 
Partners & 
Self-proprietors 
(internal) 
 
Unlimited 
liability 
 
Very high (due 
to reliance on 
income & 
unlimited 
liability) 
 
None or 
dominant 
partner 
 
None  
(or low if there is 
a dominant 
partner) 
Long-term 
economic 
performance and 
institutional 
viability 
(profitability and 
sustainability) 
Central to 
accomplishment of 
long-term 
performance 
objectives and 
institutional viability 
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 In the Public sector, organizations tend to be large, with a median 
establishment size of 138 employees in WERS 2004.  The commitment of 
customers (who are also taxpayers) to the organization is likely to be high, due 
to their reliance on the products or services provided.  Acting on behalf of 
customers, the pressure on the government to deliver of high quality at low 
taxes is substantial and continuous, enforced in the market for votes, with 
responsibility being delegated to the managers of public sector organizations.  
Where public services have been privatized, there is a shift in responsibility for 
the delivery of government objectives to the managers of large private sector 
companies that may easily find themselves having to meet the often competing 
demands of two dominant external stake-holders: those of their shareholders for 
high dividends and share price appreciation and those of government appointed 
regulators for acceptable levels and quality of services provision. Faced with 
these dilemmas, managers of public sector organizations and ex-public sector 
PLCs have incentives to deploy high-involvement HRM practices to achieve 
acceptable levels and quality of provision, and cost-cutting HRM strategies to 
keep costs within restricted budgets or the demands of shareholders. The 
contradictory pressures on the workforce have been shown to have a negative 
effect on the morale and job satisfaction of public sector workers. (Burchell et. 
al. 1999; Wilkinson, et. al. 2006).  
 
Listed PLCs tend to be large firms, with a median establishment size in WERS 
2004 of 167 employees.  Shareholders’ commitment to the organization tends to 
be low and detached, based on the number of shares they hold and the 
importance they assign to the income stream generated by dividends and share 
value appreciation.  Managers, as the agents of shareholders, are subject to high 
and continuous pressure to deliver short-term financial results and continuous 
improvements in the value of the company’s shares.  In this context, like any 
other productive factor, human resources are likely to be viewed as a resource 
to be exploited and a cost to be minimized.  Thus, given the large size of these 
establishments and the pressure to deliver continuous gains in short term 
shareholder value, we would expect to see extensive use of formal HRM 
practices, with a bias towards the cost-saving approaches. 
 
Unlisted PLCs and Private Limited Companies are relatively small firms, with a 
median establishment size in WERS 2004 of 48 employees.  Because 
shareholders cannot access the stock market to sell their shares, they have a 
relatively high level of commitment to the organization and are more likely to 
view that relationship as longer-term than do the shareholders of listed PLCs.  
Managers act in the interest of shareholders but since the primary organizational 
objective is long-term shareholder value, employees are likely to be viewed as a 
productive resource, contributing to the achievement of long-term performance 
  
 
 
13 
effectiveness.  We would therefore expect to see, where formal HRM practices 
are in use, a bias towards the more involvement-oriented approaches. 
 
Organizations serving the interests of owner-members or the public in WERS 
2004 have a median establishment size of 76 employees.  The commitment of 
owner-members, beneficiaries or the public to the organization can be expected 
to be high, due to membership and reliance on the goods or services provided.  
Management acts as their agent in pursuit of long-term economic performance 
and institutional viability. In this context, employees are likely to be viewed as 
central to the accomplishment of the organization’s objectives, although their 
distributional interests will be secondary to those of the dominant stake-holders.  
In this sector, the larger sized firms can be expected to adopt formal HRM 
practices; and we would expect a balance in practices between the cost-saving 
and involvement-enhancing approaches. 
 
Partnerships and Self-proprietorships are very small organizations, with a 
median establishment size in WERS 2004 of 20 employees.  The organizational 
commitment of partners or self-proprietors can be expected to be high, due not 
only to their unlimited liability but also their reliance on the business for 
income and employment security. The primary organizational objective is 
profitability and sustainability, with employees central to the realization of this 
objective.  But the small size of these firms suggests that it is unlikely to find 
extensive use of formal HRM practices to achieve the employment relations 
outcomes believed to contribute positively to organizational performance. 
 
In short, corporate governance can be expected to influence the dominant view 
of human resources and hence the nature of the HRM practices implemented 
and employment relations outcomes realized.  This is in large part a 
consequence of the influence of corporate governance on stake-holder relations 
and the vulnerability of internal stake-holders to the requirements of the 
dominant stake-holder.  But enterprise size can also be expected to play a 
significant role both independently and in conjunction with the form taken by 
corporate governance.   
 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS:  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND HRM 
IN THE UK 
 
WERS 2004 is a representative sample of workplaces in Britain.  It involved 
interviews with managers having responsibility for employee relations issues, 
interviews with worker representatives, and surveys completed by more than 
20,000 employees. For purposes of the analysis here, public sector 
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organizations; listed PLCs; unlisted PLCs and private limited companies; 
companies serving the interests of owner-members or the public; and 
partnerships and self-proprietorships are compared, together representing 2,284 
workplaces (589 in the public sector, 453 listed PLCs, 906 unlisted PLCs and 
private limited companies 204 companies serving the interests of owner-
members or the public and 132 partnerships and self-proprietorships).  
 
Appendix Table A presents in greater detail the variables used in the empirical 
analysis below, showing how composite variables were constructed from 
management and employee responses to WERS 2004 questions, how these were 
coded for purposes of creating the composite variables and how the items were 
aggregated. Significance levels are based on a One Way Analysis of Variance 
comparing the corporate governance forms for each of the HRM practice and 
HRM outcome variables. The statistical analysis and all later regression 
analyses are conducted at the level of the workplace (N = 2,284 for analyses 
drawing solely on manager responses; N = 1,733 when drawing on manager 
responses and employee responses).  Employee responses are aggregated to the 
level of the workplace by taking the arithmetic mean from employees surveyed 
at that workplace. On average, 13 employees were surveyed from each 
workplace.  Appendix Table B presents the correlations between the study 
variables. 
 
The five category variables of corporate governance (public sector 
organizations; listed PLCs; unlisted PLCs and private limited companies; 
companies serving the interests of owner-members or the public; and 
Partnerships and Self-proprietorships) were converted into dummy variables, 
and the omitted dummy variable was unlisted PLCs and private limited 
companies. Therefore, in the regression analyses, the effects of the other 
corporate governance forms are relative to unlisted PLCs and private limited 
companies. 
 
Composite variables for HRM practices from the employees’ survey include 
consultation and information sharing; work pressure; the amount of training and 
level of managerial encouragement to develop skills; the influence employees 
had over their job; and job security.  Of these, a positive coefficient for work 
pressure would suggest a cost-saving HRM approach while a positive 
coefficient for the other variables would represent involvement-enhancing 
HRM.  Composite variables for HRM practices from the managers’ survey take 
account of managerial commitment to strategic HRM; an indicator of 
managerial hierarchy; the quality of recruitment and selection; individual 
performance appraisals; the use of share options; and indicators of more 
involvement-enhancing approaches including consultation and information 
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sharing; employee involvement; training; work organization and job design; the 
level of control employees have over their work,; and job security. 
 
It was possible to create a wide range of composite variables for Employment 
Relations Outcomes from the Employees’ Survey, including psychological job 
stress; work pressure; job satisfaction; the quality of management/employee 
relations; organizational commitment; and trust.  From the managers’ survey, 
however, only a limited number of HRM outcomes variables could be 
constructed; these include whether managers could trust their employees not to 
take unfair advantage, how they rated their relationship with employees and 
their perception of employees’ commitment the values of the organization. 
Other indicators of employment relations outcomes were constructed from 
questions about quit rates and working days lost through sickness or other forms 
of absence; and levels of disputes, individual grievances, and sanctions. 
 
To investigate more closely the separate effects of corporate governance form 
and establishment and organizational size on HRM practices and HRM 
outcomes, we conducted two sets of regression analysis.  In the first model, 
corporate governance, establishment and organizational size are used to predict 
HRM practices and outcomes.  In the second model, HRM practices are added 
to corporate governance and size to predict HRM outcomes.  In each regression, 
corporate governance form is introduced in step 1 and size is entered in step 2.  
In the second regression model, HRM practices are entered in step 3.  The 
results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3.  
 
Corporate governance, size and HRM practices 
Table 2 summarizes the regression results for the model in which corporate 
governance and size are used to predict HRM practices, from the perspective of 
managers and of employees.  Unless stated otherwise, all reported standardized 
regression coefficients (betas) reported in the text are significant at p < 0.001 
level.   
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TABLE 2 : Corporate governance, establishment and organization size as predictors of 
HRM practices:  Management and employee questionnaires  
Management questionnaire 
HRM Practices: Commitment 
to HRM 
Hierarchy Selection & 
induction 
Training Work orgn & 
job flexibility 
Influence 
in work 
Job 
security 
Consultation 
committees 
Consultation
est & orgn 
Consultation 
staffing 
Consultation
targets 
 Standardised Beta Coefficients 
Corporate governance form 
Public sector 
Listed PLCs 
Unlisted PLCs1 
Owner-member 
     firms 
Partner & self- 
     proprietorships 
0.22*** 
0.37*** 
Ref. 
 
0.14*** 
 
-0.10*** 
0.11*** 
-0.00 
Ref. 
 
0.04 
 
-0.01 
0.18*** 
0.21*** 
Ref. 
 
0.08*** 
 
-0.07*** 
0.21*** 
0.22*** 
Ref. 
 
0.09*** 
 
0.02 
0.09*** 
0.07** 
Ref. 
 
0.05* 
 
-0.01 
0.14*** 
-0.06* 
Ref. 
 
0.11*** 
 
0.05* 
0.09*** 
-0.03 
Ref. 
 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
0.29*** 
0.37*** 
Ref. 
 
0.09*** 
 
-0.10*** 
0.21*** 
0.27*** 
Ref. 
 
0.10*** 
 
-0.11*** 
0.19*** 
0.11*** 
Ref. 
 
0.10*** 
 
-0.04 
0.13*** 
0.19*** 
Ref. 
 
0.02 
 
-0.11*** 
Size 
Establishment size 
Organization size 
-0.04* 
0.46*** 
0.19*** 
-0.04 
0.37*** 
0.19*** 
-0.02 
0.22*** 
0.05* 
0.02 
-0.11*** 
-0.07** 
-0.03 
0.06* 
0.23*** 
0.28*** 
0.14*** 
0.22*** 
0.28*** 
0.03 
0.05* 
0.22*** 
 Adjusted R-square 
CG form 
CG form and Size 
0.16*** 
0.30*** 
0.01*** 
0.04*** 
0.06*** 
0.25*** 
0.06*** 
0.09*** 
0.01*** 
0.01*** 
0.03*** 
0.05*** 
0.01*** 
0.01*** 
0.18*** 
0.32*** 
0.11*** 
0.18*** 
0.04*** 
0.11*** 
0.06*** 
0.10*** 
 Management questionnaire Employee questionnaire 
HRM Practices: Consultation: 
e’ee views 
Employee 
involvement 
Performance 
Appraisals 
Performance 
based pay 
Share 
options 
Consultation Work 
pressure 
Training Influence in 
work 
Job security 
 Standardised Beta Coefficients 
Corporate governance form 
Public sector 
Listed PLCs 
Unlisted PLCs1 
Owner-member 
     firms  
Partner & self- 
      proprietorships 
0.37*** 
0.21*** 
Ref. 
 
0.14*** 
 
-0.05** 
0.32*** 
0.16*** 
Ref. 
 
0.08*** 
 
-0.07*** 
0.32*** 
0.23*** 
Ref. 
 
0.14*** 
 
-0.03 
-0.41*** 
0.11*** 
Ref. 
 
-0.18*** 
 
-0.09*** 
-0.11*** 
0.52*** 
Ref. 
 
-0.04* 
 
-0.06*** 
-0.05 
-0.02 
Ref. 
 
0.03 
 
0.09*** 
0.35*** 
0.09*** 
Ref. 
 
0.05* 
 
-0.06* 
0.29*** 
0.08*** 
Ref. 
 
0.14*** 
 
0.10*** 
-0.13*** 
-0.13*** 
Ref. 
 
0.08** 
 
-0.01 
-0.05 
-0.13*** 
Ref. 
 
-0.01 
 
0.09*** 
Size 
Establishment size 
Organization size 
0.08*** 
0.21*** 
0.33*** 
0.10*** 
0.13*** 
0.19*** 
0.09*** 
0.13*** 
0.00 
0.19*** 
-0.32*** 
0.02 
-0.05* 
0.07* 
-0.10*** 
0.09** 
-0.02 
-0.20*** 
-0.14*** 
-0.04 
 Adjusted R-square 
CG form 
CG Form and Size 
0.14*** 
0.18*** 
0.10*** 
0.23*** 
0.11*** 
0.17*** 
0.22*** 
0.24*** 
0.34*** 
0.36*** 
0.01*** 
0.10*** 
0.12*** 
0.12*** 
0.07*** 
0.08*** 
0.04*** 
0.07*** 
0.03*** 
0.05*** 
1 ‘Unlisted PLCs’ is the omitted dummy variable.    *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
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Considering the managers’ viewpoint first, operating in the public sector was 
positively associated with all HRM practices (beta ranged from 0.09 to 0.37), 
relative to the omitted dummy variable of unlisted PLCs and private limited 
companies, with the exception of performance related pay and share options for 
which public sector establishments were negatively related (beta = -0.41 and –
0.11 respectively). Public sector establishments were most strongly (i.e., beta > 
+/-0.30) associated with consultation (managers seek and respond to employee 
views), employee involvement, individual performance appraisals, and 
performance-based pay (negative association).  Listed PLCs were positively 
related to 12 out of the 16 HRM practices (beta ranged from 0.11 to 0.52); and 
these establishments were most strongly (i.e., beta > 0.30) associated with 
managerial commitment to HRM, consultation involving committees, and the 
use of share options.  Owner-member firms were positively associated with 10 
out of the 16 HRM practices (beta ranged from 0.08 to 0.14) and negatively 
related to performance related pay (beta = -0.18).  Partnerships and self-
proprietorships were positively related to none of the HRM practices and 
negatively related to 8 out of the 16 HRM practices (beta ranged from -0.06 to –
0.11).  Inspection of the adjusted R squares shows that the extent to which 
corporate governance forms explain HRM practices ranges widely, from 0.01 
(proportion of employees in supervisory positions, work organization and job 
flexibility and job security) to 0.34 (provision of share options). 
 
Considering the employees’ views of HRM practices, there were fewer 
indicators of HRM practices in the employees’ questionnaire, 5 in total.  In 
these models, belonging to the public sector was positively associated with 
work pressure (beta = 0.35) and training (beta = 0.29) and negatively related to 
influence over work (beta = -0.13). The public sector had by far the strongest 
relationships with both work pressure and training.  Listed PLCs were 
positively associated with work pressure (beta = 0.09) and training (beta = 0.08), 
and negatively related to influence over work (beta = -0.13) and job security 
(beta = -0.13).  Owner-member firms were positively associated with training 
(beta = 0.14) and had a small positive relationship with influence over work 
(beta = 0.08, p < 0.01).  Partnerships and self-proprietorships were positively 
associated with consultation (beta = 0.09), training (beta = 0.10) and job 
security (beta = 0.09). Employee ratings of HRM practices therefore reveal an 
interesting contrast to manager ratings; recall that manager ratings for these 
establishments were generally negative.  Inspection of the adjusted R squares 
shows that the extent corporate governance forms explain HRM practices 
ranges from 0.01 (consultation) to 0.12 (work pressure). 
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When establishment and organization size are considered, from the perspective 
of managers, the majority of coefficients are significant and positive, suggesting 
that the larger the establishment and the larger the organization, the greater the 
use of formal HRM practices, regardless of the form of corporate governance.  
The exception is employee control over their jobs, which has a negative 
association with establishment and organization size (beta = -0.11 and -0.07, 
respectively).  From the viewpoint of employees, the results are largely negative.  
Establishment size is negatively associated with consultation (beta = -0.32), 
training (beta = -0.10) and job security (beta = -0.14); and organization size is 
negatively associated with control over work (beta = -0.20).  The importance of 
the size variables in determining the relative formality of HRM practices is 
evident in the substantial increase in the R squares for the vast majority of HRM 
practices when size is introduced into the regression models.  The exceptions 
are, from the viewpoint of managers, work organization and job design, job 
security, performance-based pay and share options, for which size does not 
increase the R square; and work pressure from the perspective of employees.    
 
Corporate governance, size and employment relations outcomes  
Table 3 summarizes the regression results where corporate governance, size and 
HRM practices are used to predict employment relations outcomes.   
 
Considering the regressions for outcomes based on the responses of managers, 
public sector establishments were positively associated with trust, employee 
commitment to the organization, absenteeism, and disputes (beta ranges from 
0.08 to 0.15); and the public sector had a small negative association with the 
quality of employee-management relations (beta = -0.05, p < 0.05).  Listed 
PLCs returned the most negative set of associations with HRM outcomes, being 
positively related to absenteeism (beta = 0.09) and disputes (beta = 0.17), and 
having small negative associations with the quality of employee-management 
relations (beta = -0.06, p < 0.05) and employee commitment to the organization 
(beta = -0.06, p < 0.05).  Owner-member firms were positively related to trust 
(beta = 0.09) and employee commitment to the organization (beta = 0.10).  
Partnerships and self-proprietorships were positively related to the quality of 
employee-management relations (beta = 0.08) and negatively related to disputes 
(beta = -0.10).   
 
  
 
 
TABLE 3 
HRM Practices as a predictor of HRM outcomes: Management and Employee perspectives on HRM outcomes 
 Management Perspective Employees’ Perspective 
HRM Outcomes: Trust E’ee-mgmt 
relations 
Commit-
ment 
Absences Disputes Job stress Work 
pressure 
Job 
satisfaction 
E’ee-mgt 
relations 
Commi-
tment 
Trust 
 Standardised Beta Coefficients 
Corporate Governance Form 
Public sector 
Listed PLCs 
Unlisted PLCs1 
Owner-member firms 
Partner & proprietorships 
0.09*** 
0.04 
Ref. 
0.09*** 
0.04 
-0.05* 
-0.06* 
Ref. 
-0.02 
0.08*** 
0.09*** 
-0.06* 
Ref. 
0.10*** 
0.03 
0.15*** 
0.09*** 
Ref. 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.08*** 
0.17*** 
Ref. 
0.03 
-0.10*** 
0.16*** 
0.09*** 
Ref. 
-0.03 
-0.10*** 
0.19*** 
0.04 
Ref. 
0.00 
-0.00 
-0.08** 
-0.16*** 
Ref. 
0.06* 
0.10*** 
-0.11*** 
-0.08** 
Ref. 
-0.01 
0.13*** 
0.03 
-0.11*** 
Ref. 
0.15*** 
0.09*** 
-0.09*** 
-0.10*** 
Ref. 
0.02 
0.13*** 
Size 
Establishment size 
Organization size 
-0.07** 
-0.04 
-0.24*** 
-0.04 
-0.13*** 
-0.09** 
-0.01 
0.11*** 
0.72*** 
0.03 
0.04 
.09** 
-0.02 
0.06 
-0.14*** 
-0.18*** 
-0.35*** 
-0.04 
-0.11*** 
-0.17*** 
-0.35*** 
-0.07* 
HRM Practices:  Management responses 
Commitment to HRM 
Hierarchy 
Selection & induction 
Training 
Work orgn & job flex 
Influence in work 
Job security 
Consult committees 
Consult: est & org 
Consult: staffing 
Consult: targets 
Consult: e’ee views 
Employee involvement 
Perf appraisals 
Perf related pay 
Share options 
0.01 
0.01 
0.05 
0.04 
-0.02 
0.06* 
-0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.07* 
-0.03 
0.02 
-0.04 
0.02 
0.07* 
0.02 
-0.04 
0.01 
0.08** 
0.05* 
0.03 
-0.00 
-0.01 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
-0.03 
-0.02 
0.02 
0.08** 
0.04 
-0.00 
0.07** 
0.05 
0.09*** 
0.04 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.03 
-0.00 
0.12*** 
0.00 
-0.06* 
0.06* 
-0.01 
0.06 
0.00 
-0.05 
0.06 
-0.02 
-0.10*** 
0.01 
0.00 
-0.02 
0.00 
0.07* 
0.03 
0.00 
-0.00 
-0.02 
-0.04 
-0.02 
0.01 
0.04* 
0.01 
0.00 
-0.05** 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.06** 
0.05** 
-0.03 
0.03 
-0.01 
0.03 
-0.04 
-0.05* 
0.03 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.02 
0.04 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
-0.00 
0.08*** 
0.08*** 
0.01 
-0.01*** 
0.02 
-0.03 
0.04 
0.02 
-0.05* 
0.01 
0.03 
-0.00 
-0.01 
0.04 
0.00 
-0.09*** 
0.02 
-0.04 
-0.04 
-0.01 
0.03* 
-0.02 
0.01 
-0.02 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.03* 
-0.02 
-0.01 
-0.05*** 
-0.03 
-0.04* 
-0.01 
0.02* 
-0.03 
-0.01 
-0.01 
0.02 
-0.01 
-0.04** 
-0.02 
0.01 
-0.02 
-0.00 
-0.02 
-0.03* 
-0.00 
0.03 
-0.05* 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.03 
-0.00 
0.03 
-0.03 
0.06** 
0.01 
0.01 
-0.02 
0.01 
-0.01 
-0.07*** 
0.01 
-0.03 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.03** 
-0.00 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.03* 
0.02 
-0.04** 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.04*** 
-0.01 
0.00 
HRM Practices:  Employee responses 
Consultation 
Work pressure 
Training 
Influence in work 
Job security 
0.21*** 
0.04 
0.01 
0.01 
0.05 
0.31*** 
0.01 
0.02 
-0.04 
0.04 
0.21*** 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.02 
0.06* 
-0.08* 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.04 
0.03 
-0.13*** 
-0.06*** 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
-0.22*** 
0.49*** 
0.08*** 
-0.10*** 
-0.21*** 
0.07* 
0.50*** 
0.01 
-0.04 
0.14*** 
0.39*** 
-0.10*** 
0.17*** 
0.30*** 
0.30*** 
0.74*** 
-0.05*** 
0.05** 
0.04** 
0.07*** 
0.40*** 
-0.00 
0.18*** 
0.19*** 
0.21*** 
0.77*** 
-0.07*** 
0.06** 
0.03* 
0.07*** 
Adjusted r-squares 0.09*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.04*** 0.54*** 0.42*** 0.29*** 0.73*** 0.76*** 0.56*** 0.81*** 
1 ‘Unlisted PLCs’ is the omitted dummy variable.   *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
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Considering HRM outcomes from the perspective of employees, public sector 
establishments were generally associated with negative attitudes.  There were 
negative relationships between being in the public sector and the quality of 
employee-management relations (beta = -0.11) and trust (beta = -0.09; note a 
reverse relationship to that found from the managers perspective); and there 
were positive associations with psychological stress (beta = 0.16) and work 
pressure (beta = 0.19). Negative attitudes were also generally the case for listed 
PLCs, where there were negative associations with job satisfaction (beta = -
0.16), organizational commitment (beta = -0.11) and trust (beta = -0.10) and a 
positive association with psychological stress (beta = 0.09).  Owner-member 
establishments were positively associated to organizational commitment (beta = 
0.15).  Partnerships and self-proprietorships by far reported the most positive 
attitudes. There were positive associations with job satisfaction (beta = 0.10), 
the quality of employee-management relations (beta = 0.13), organizational 
commitment (beta = 0.09) and trust (beta = 0.13) and a negative association 
with psychological stress (beta = -0.10).  
 
When size is considered, from the perspective of managers, establishment size 
is significant and positively associated with disputes (beta = 0.72) but 
negatively related to the quality of employee-management relations (beta = -
0.24) and organizational commitment (beta = -0.13).  Organization size is 
significant and positively associated with absences (beta = 0.11). These patterns 
are even stronger from the viewpoint of employees, where establishment size is 
overwhelmingly significant and negatively associated with job satisfaction (beta 
= -0.14), the quality of employee-management relations (beta = -0.35), 
organizational commitment (beta = -0.11) and trust (beta = -0.35).  Organization 
size is significant and negatively related to job satisfaction (beta = -0.18) and 
organizational commitment (beta = -0.17).     
 
HRM Practices and Employment Relations Outcomes  
When HRM practices are added to the model, the regressions from the 
perspective of managers are not very strong in terms of their R-square, aside 
from the model for disputes, which has an R-square of 54 percent.  In this 
model, after controlling for corporate governance and size, the most significant 
and strongest of the HRM practices is the employees view that they are not 
being consulted (beta = -0.13).  This variable is consistently significant and 
positive in predicting the existence of trust (beta = 0.21), the quality of 
employee / management relations (beta = 0.31) and organizational commitment 
(beta = 0.21).  Because the other models for employment relations outcomes 
from the perspective of managers are weak in terms of the R-square and do not 
contain many significant relationships in the contribution made by including 
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HRM practices, we now turn to the models predicting employment relations 
outcomes from the viewpoint of employees.   
 
In these models, what is immediately apparent is the power in terms of the R-
square for all but the work pressure (R-square = 29 percent) and to a lesser 
degree psychological job stress (R-square = 42 percent) models.  By contrast, 
the models for trust, the quality of employee / management relations, job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment and psychological job stress are all 
exceptionally strong, with R-squares of 81, 76, 73 and 56 percent, respectively.  
In each of these models, the HRM practice variables from the viewpoint of 
employees are overwhelmingly significant, with the same sign across the 
models.  The strongest of these HRM practice variables in terms of the value of 
the beta coefficient is the consultation variable, which ranges from 0.39 to 0.77.  
In general, employees report a high level of trust, a high quality of employee / 
management relationships, and a high level of job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment when they are consulted (beta = 0.77, 0.74, 0.39 
and 0.40, respectively), trained (beta = 0.06 [p < 0.01], 0.05 [p < 0.01], 0.17 and 
0.18, respectively), have influence over their work (beta = 0.03 [p < 0.05], 0.04 
[p < 0.01], 0.30, 0.19, respectively), feel that their jobs are secure (beta = 0.07, 
0.07, 0.30, 0.21, respectively), and have sufficient time to do their jobs (beta = -
0.07, -0.05, -0.10 and -0.00 [p non-significant], respectively).  In the model for 
psychological job stress, it is clear that employees feel psychological stress at 
work when they are not consulted (beta = -0.22), are not given control over their 
work (beta = -0.10) or job security (beta = -0.21), and when they do not have 
sufficient time to do their jobs (beta = 0.49). 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Within organizations, corporate governance imposes a structure on stake-holder 
relationships that has the potential to undermine the ability and willingness of 
managers and employees to fully commit themselves to each other and to the 
organization and its objectives.  In so doing, corporate governance may impede 
the effectiveness of the HRM system in achieving its strategic potential.  This is 
particularly the case when a remote external stake-holder is assigned 
dominance. When large size is also a factor, there may be additional challenges 
to achieving the outcomes that HRM is ideally designed to deliver (i.e., job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment and a high quality of employee / 
management relationships).  In this case, increased formalisation of the HRM 
system and the use of involvement-enhancing HRM practices may help to 
overcome these challenges, but only if employees perceive them to be a form of 
empowerment in their work.   
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It was hypothesised that by virtue of the dominance assigned to a remote stake-
holder group and their large size, listed PLCs and public sector organizations 
would have incentives to make use of formal HRM practices, with a possible 
bias towards cost-saving approaches in the listed PLCs and involvement-
enhancing HRM in the public sector.  The reverse was hypothesised for 
partnerships and self-proprietorships, with unlisted PLCs and organizations 
serving owner-members or the public located somewhere in between.   
 
These hypotheses were borne out in WERS 2004, where managerial responses 
indicated extensive use of formal HRM practices in public sector organizations 
and listed PLCs, less so in owner-member firms and a notable absence of 
formal HRM practices in partnerships and self-proprietorships (Table 2).  
Public sector organizations made use of all of the HRM practices we examined, 
aside from performance-based pay and share option schemes, which were 
unique to Listed PLCs.  But public sector employees disagreed with their 
managers on the question of whether they were given influence and control in 
their work and job security (although the latter was not statistically significant).  
In listed PLCs, we found evidence that all of the HRM practices in our study 
were being deployed, aside from extensive supervision and providing 
employees with influence and control over their work or job security, findings 
that were also supported by employee responses.  Most of these formal HRM 
practices were also being used in owner-member firms, but the relatively lower 
regression coefficients suggest a lower propensity to make use of these 
practices than in the listed PLCs or public sector.  However, both managers and 
employees in owner-member firms reported that employees were given 
influence and control over their work.   In partnerships and self-proprietorships, 
there was little evidence of formal HRM practices; however, managers reported 
that employees were given influence and control over their work; and from the 
viewpoint of employees, these establishments were providing job security, 
consultation and training. 
 
Considering the relationship between corporate governance and employment 
relations outcomes in WERS 2004, in public sector establishments and listed 
PLCs, employee job satisfaction, organizational commitment, trust and quality 
of employee / management relations were low while job stress and work 
pressure were high. This contrasts sharply with outcomes in partnerships and 
self-proprietorships (Table 3, Step 1).   From the viewpoint of both managers 
and employees, the added challenge imposed by size was evident in the models 
for job satisfaction, quality of employee / management relations, organizational 
commitment and trust (Table 3, Step 2).  These findings are not surprising when 
the evidence from WERS 2004 with respect to the relationship between HRM 
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practices and employment relations outcomes is taken into account.  Here we 
found that employees feel less job stress, greater job satisfaction, more 
committed to the organization and a higher level of trust and they highly rate 
the quality of employee / management relationships when they are being 
consulted, given sufficient time to do their jobs, appropriately trained, given 
control over the way they perform their work and job security (Table 3).   
 
When these findings are brought together with the analysis of the relationship 
between corporate governance and HRM practices, the outcomes generated in 
the various corporate governance forms are what we might have predicted.  
From the perspective of employees, the predominant HRM practices in the 
public sector and listed PLCs did not give them influence and control over their 
work, job security or enough time to perform their jobs (Table 2).  So it is not 
surprising that job satisfaction, organisational commitment, trust and the quality 
of employment relations were low.  By contrast, in organizations serving the 
interests of owner-members or the public, although employees tended to feel 
that they did not have sufficient time to do their jobs, they felt that they did 
have influence and control over their work; and in partnerships and self-
proprietorships, employees were being consulted, given enough time to perform 
their jobs, adequate training and job security.   Thus, there are lessons that 
might be learned in terms of the HRM practices that are most likely to deliver 
desirable employment relations outcomes in organisations operating under 
alternative forms of corporate governance.  But what is perhaps most interesting 
is the fact that despite the absence of formal HRM practices in partnerships and 
self-proprietorships, it would appear that as a consequence of their relatively 
small size and high degree of mutuality of interests in the long-term 
performance of these establishments, employees are experiencing the 
employment relationship in a way that generates the positive outcomes that 
formal HRM is ideally designed to deliver.  
 
 
Notes 
1
 See Guest, 1997, for an overview. 
2
 These include companies limited by guarantee, trusts and charities, bodies 
established by royal charter, and cooperatives, mutuals and friendly societies. 
3
 For the individual this conflict is between their roles as taxpayers and users of 
public sector services.
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Appendix Table A 
 
Composite 
Variable 
Question Response Variable 
Code 
Employee Questionnaire 
HRM Practices 
Variable name Measurement items  Rating scale Significance 
level * 
 
5 (very good) to 1 
(very poor) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consultation & 
info sharing 
Arithmetic mean across 7 items: 
How good are managers at keeping employees informed about: 
1. Changes in the way organization is run 
2. Financial matters, including budgets and profits 
How good are managers at keeping employees informed about: 
3. Changes in staffing 
4. Changes in the way you do your job 
How good are managers at: 
5. Seeking views of employees or representatives 
6. Responding to suggestions from employees or 
representatives 
7. Allowing employees or reps to influence decisions 
Managers here: 
8. Are sincere in trying to understand employees’ views 
 5 (strongly agree) to 
1 (strongly disagree) 
 
.000 
Work pressure Single item: 
I never seem to have enough time to get my job done 
5 (strongly agree) to 
1 (strongly disagree) 
 
.000 
 
1 (none) to 5 (10 days 
or more) 
Training 
 
Arithmetic mean across two items: 
1. Apart from health & safety, how much training have you 
had, organized by employer 
2. Managers here encourage people to develop skills 5 (strongly agree) to 
1 (strongly disagree) 
.000 
Influence over 
work 
Arithmetic mean across four items: 
How much influence do you have over: 
1. Tasks you do in your job 
2. Pace at which you work 
3. How you do your work 
4. Order in which you carry out tasks 
 
 
4 (a lot) to 1 (none) 
 
.000 
Job Security Single item: 
I feel my job is secure in this workplace 
5 (strongly agree) to 
1 (strongly disagree) 
.000 
HRM Outcomes 
 
5 (strongly agree) to 
1 (strongly disagree) 
Psychological 
job stress 
Arithmetic mean across four items: 
1. I worry a lot about my work outside working hours 
How much time has your job made you: 
2. Tense 
3. Worried 
4. Uneasy 
5. Calm (reverse scored) 
6. Relaxed (reverse scored) 
7. Content (reverse scored) 
 
 
5 (all of the time) to 1 
(never) 
.000 
Work pressure Single item: 
My job requires that I work very hard 
5 (strongly agree) to 
1 (strongly disagree) 
.000 
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Job satisfaction 
 
Arithmetic mean across 8 items: 
How satisfied are you with: 
1. Sense of achievement from work 
2. Scope for using initiative 
3. Influence over job 
4. Training you receive 
5. Amount of pay you receive 
6. Job security 
7. Work itself 
8. Involvement you have in decision-making 
 
 
 
5 (very satisfied) to 1 
(very dissatisfied) 
 
 
 
.000 
Quality of 
employee- 
management 
relations 
Single item: 
How would you describe relations between managers & 
employees here? 
 
5 (very good) to  
1 (very poor) 
 
.000 
Organizational 
commitment 
Arithmetic mean across 3 items: 
1. I share many of the values of my organization 
2. I feel loyal to my organization 
3. I am proud to tell people who I work for 
 
5 (strongly agree) to 
1 (strongly disagree) 
 
.000 
Trust and 
confidence in 
management 
Arithmetic mean across four items: 
Managers here: 
1. Can be relied upon to keep promises 
2. Are sincere in trying to understand employees’ views 
3. Deal with employees honestly 
4. Treat employees fairly 
 
5 (strongly agree) to 
1 (strongly disagree) 
 
 
.000 
Management Questionnaire 
HRM Practices 
Managerial 
commitment to 
strategic HRM 
Count across 5 items: 
1. High level manager or director at separate establishment 
responsible for personnel or employment relations matters 
2. Employment relations representative on Board 
3. Workplace employment relations issues of employee 
development, job satisfaction, diversity, and staff forecasts 
covered by formal strategic plan 
4. Employment relations manager involved in preparation of 
plan 
5. Investor in People award 
 
1 (Yes), 0 (No) 
 
 
.000 
Hierarchy Single item: 
% non-managerial employees with supervisory responsibility 
 
7 (all) to 1 (none) 
 
.000 
Recruitment, 
selection & 
induction 
Count across 3 items: 
Does the establishment conduct: 
1. Personality and aptitude tests 
2. Performance and competence tests 
3. Standard induction program for new employees 
 
 
1 (Yes) 0 (No) 
 
 
.000 
Training Count across 4 items: 
1. % employees given off-the-job training 
2. Number of days training received 
 
3. % employees trained to do jobs other than their own 
4. Performance appraisals used to determine training needs 
 
1 (60%+), 0 (< 60%) 
1 (1 week or more), 0 
(less than 1 week) 
1 (40%+), 0 (< 40%) 
1 (Yes) 0 (No) 
 
.000 
Organization of 
work & job 
flexibility 
Count across 4 items: 
1. We ask employees to help in ways not specified in their job 
descriptions 
2. % employees doing jobs other than own 
3. Degree of variety in employees’ work 
4. % employees involved in formal teams 
 
1 (strongly agree or 
agree), 0 (otherwise) 
1 (20%+), 0 (< 20%) 
1 (a lot) 0 (< ‘a lot’) 
1 (80%+) 0 (< 80%) 
 
.000 
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Employee 
influence over 
work 
Arithmetic mean across 3 items: 
1. Degree of discretion in work 
2. Degree of control over pace of work 
3. Degree of involvement in decisions over how work is 
organized 
 
 
4 (a lot) to 1 (none) 
 
.000 
Job security 1. Employees expect long-term employment security  
 
2. Is there a policy of guaranteed job security or no comp. 
redundancies for all employees at this workplace? 
1 (strongly agree, 
agree), 0 (otherwise) 
1 (Yes), 0 (No) 
 
.000 
Consultation & 
info sharing: 
Committees 
Count across 5 items: 
1. Meetings between management and entire workforce 
2. Meetings between supervisors and employees 
3. Consultation committees (management and employees) 
4. Higher level consultation committees 
5. European Works Council 
 
 
1 (Yes), 0 (No) 
 
.000 
Consultation & 
info sharing: 
Establishment 
& organization 
Count across 3 items: 
Does management regularly share information with employees 
about: 
1. Internal investment plans 
2. Financial position of establishment 
3. Financial position of organization 
 
 
 
1 (Yes), 0 (No) 
 
.000 
Consultation & 
info sharing: 
Staffing & 
redundancies 
Count across 3 items: 
1. Does management regularly share information with 
employees about staffing plans? 
2. If redundancies, did you consult with employees or their 
representatives? 
3. If redundancy proposal was withdrawn, did you consult? 
 
 
 
1 (Yes) 0 (No) 
 
.000 
Consultation & 
info sharing: 
Targets 
Count across 2 items: 
1. Are targets (sales, costs, profits, productivity, quality. 
turnover, satisfaction, etc.) set in consultation with 
employees or employee representatives? 
2. Are employees or representatives informed of targets? 
 
 
1 (Yes) 0 (No)  
 
.000 
Consultation & 
information 
sharing: 
Managers seek 
& respond to 
employee views 
Count across 4 items: 
1. Those at the top are best placed to make decisions about 
this workplace 
2. Decisions at this workplace are made without consulting 
employees (reverse scored) 
3. We do not introduce changes w/out first discussing 
implications with employees 
4. Formal survey of employee views in 2 yrs 
 
 
1 (strongly agree, 
agree) 0 (otherwise) 
 
 
 
1 (Yes) 0 (No) 
 
.000 
Employee 
involvement in 
introducing & 
implementing 
change 
Count across 2 items: 
1. If management introduced change, what type of 
involvement did affected employees have in introducing & 
implementing it? 
 
 
2. Problem solving groups, quality circles & continuous  
improvement groups 
 
1 (they decided, 
negotiated, or 
consulted), 0 (were 
informed, or had no 
involvement) 
1 (Yes), 2 (No) 
 
.000 
Performance 
appraisals 
Count across 2 items: 
1. Formal job evaluation scheme 
2. % non-management employees subject to performance 
appraisals 
 
1 (Yes), 2 (No) 
1 (All), 0 (< all) 
 
.000 
  
 
 
29 
Performance 
related pay 
Count across 7 items: 
1. Pay linked to formal job evaluation 
2. Payment by results or merit  
3. % non-management employees receiving performance 
related pay 
4. Profit related pay 
5. % non-management employees receiving profit related pay 
6. Pay linked to org/workplace performance 
7. Pay linked to org/workplace productivity 
 
1 (Yes), 0 (No) 
1 (Yes), 0 (No) 
1 (All), 0 (< all) 
 
1 (Yes), 0 (No) 
1 (All), 0 (< all) 
1 (Yes), 0 (No) 
1 (Yes), 0 (No) 
 
.000 
Share options 
related pay 
Count across 2 items: 
1. % non-management eligible for share options plan 
2. % non-management employees participating in plan 
 
1 (All), 0 (< all) 
 
.000 
HRM Outcomes 
Trust Single item: 
Given the chance, employees try to take unfair advantage of 
management 
1 (strongly agree) 
to  
5 (strongly 
disagree) 
 
.000 
Quality of 
employee-
management 
relations 
Single item: 
How would you rate the relationship between management and 
employees 
 
5 (very good) to  
1 (very poor) 
 
.000 
Employee 
commitment to 
the organization 
Single item: 
Employees are fully committed to the values of this organization  
 
5 (strongly agree) 
to 1 (strongly 
disagree) 
 
.000 
Absenteeism Single item: 
% work days lost through employee sickness or absence 
  
.000 
Disputes, 
grievances & 
sanctions 
Count across 10 items: 
Occurrence over the past year: 
1. Collective dispute over pay or conditions 
2. Individual grievances 
3. Formal verbal warning 
4. Formal written warning 
5. Suspension with or without pay 
6. Deduction from pay 
7. Dismissal 
8. Internal transfer 
9. Have employees had these sanctions applied to them? 
10. Has employee or ex-employee made application to an 
Employment Tribunal? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 (Yes); 0 (No) 
 
 
 
 
 
.000 
* Significance level based on one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing corporate governance forms for 
each HRM system, HRM system performance and organizational performance variable. 
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Appendix TABLE B: Zero-order correlations between study variables 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1 Public sector                            
2 Listed PLCs -.29                          
3 Unlisted PLCs  -.48 -.40                         
4 Partnerships & self-
proprietorships 
-.15 -.12 -.20                        
5 Owner-member firms -.18 -.16 -.25 -.08                       
Employee responses                           
6 Consultation -.06 -.02 .01 .10 .03                      
7 Work pressure .32 -.01 -.22 -.12 -.02 -.13                     
8 Training .23 -.04 -.24 .03 .06 .54 .16                    
9 E’ee influence in work -.11 -.10 .10 .01 .13 .33 -.03 .16                   
10 Job security -.02 -.13 .06 .11 .02 .40 -.06 .19 .21                  
Management responses                           
11 Commitment to HRM .10 .30 -.28 -.19 .05 .01 .16 .25 -.15 -.07                 
12 Hierarchy .10 -.04 -.06 -.03 .02 -.02 .09 .10 .04 .01 .09                
13 Selection & induction .11 .16 -.18 -.13 .02 -.12 .11 .16 -.11 -.19 .33 .12               
14 Training .12 .15 -.22 -.05 .02 .07 .16 .39 -.06 -.01 .36 .08 .24              
15 Work org & job flex .06 .04 -.08 -.04 .02 .02 .14 .14 .03 -.03 .13 .09 .14 .35             
16 E’ee influence in work .13 -.12 -.08 .03 .09 .19 .16 .24 .22 .08 .03 .06 -.02 .13 .23            
17 Job security .09 -.05 -.03 .00 -.02 .00 .02 .01 -.05 .20 .07 .00 -.02 .03 .01 .03           
18 Consult. committees .18 .29 -.29 -.19 -.02 -.11 .19 .18 -.13 -.18 .46 .11 .42 .34 .19 .01 -.01          
19 Consultation: est & org .13 .21 -.21 -.19 .02 -.02 .15 .14 -.07 -.11 .34 .08 .31 .24 .18 .09 .03 .40         
20 Consultation: staffing .15 .04 -.15 -.09 .05 -.09 .13 .09 -.03 -.15 .19 .11 .27 .17 .13 .13 -.04 .30 .28        
21 Consultation: targets .09 .16 -.12 -.15 -.03 .02 .12 .18 -.10 -.08 .33 .05 .25 .25 .12 .03 .02 .32 .34 .21       
22 Consultation: e’ee view .29 .09 -.28 -.14 .04 .02 .15 .22 -.10 -.04 .33 .06 .29 .28 .16 .14 .02 .37 .33 .24 .26      
23 Employee involvement .27 .06 -.22 -.14 .00 -.16 .12 .08 -.10 -.14 .26 .14 .32 .22 .15 .05 .04 .41 .32 .27 .21 .29     
24 Performance appraisals .23 .11 -.28 -.11 .05 -.01 .18 .29 -.01 -.10 .35 .08 .34 .40 .12 .08 .04 .39 .28 .22 .22 .30 .28    
25 Perf. related pay -.40 .27 .22 -.03 -.11 .00 -.05 -.04 -.03 -.13 .12 -.03 .11 .12 .09 -.03 -.04 .14 .14 .07 .15 -.03 .03 .09   
26 Share options -.25 .57 -.13 -.11 -.10 -.02 .03 -.01 -.07 -.13 .24 -.02 .17 .17 .07 -.06 -.04 .26 .20 .05 .16 .09 .10 .16 .29  
* Rows 1 to 5 and 11 to 26 reported by managers, N ranges from 2295 to 2284. For r > 0.05; p < 0.05, r > 0.06, p < 0.01; r > 0.07, p < 0.001. 
** Rows 6 to 10 reported by employees, N ranges from 1733 to 1726. For r > 0.05, p < 0.05; r > 0.06, p < 0.01; r > 0.08, p < 0.001.
  
 
 
 
Notes 
i
 See Guest, 1997, for an overview. 
ii
 These include companies limited by guarantee, trusts and charities, bodies established 
by royal charter, and cooperatives, mutuals and friendly societies. 
iii
 For the individual this conflict is between their roles as taxpayers and users of public 
sector services.   
